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The smuggling of special nuclear materials (SNM) through international borders could enable nuclear terror-
ism and constitutes a significant threat to global security. This paper presents the experimental demonstration
of a novel radiographic technique for quantitatively reconstructing the density and type of material present
in commercial cargo containers, as a means of detecting such threats. Unlike traditional techniques which
use sources of bremsstrahlung photons with a continuous distribution of energies, multiple monoenergetic
gamma radiography (MMGR) utilizes monoenergetic photons from nuclear reactions, specifically the 4.4 and
15.1 MeV photons from the 11B(d,nγ)12C reaction. By exploiting the Z-dependence of the photon interaction
cross sections at these two specific energies it is possible to simultaneously determine the areal density and
the effective atomic number as a function of location for a 2D projection of a scanned object. The additional
information gleaned from using and detecting photons of specific energies for radiography substantially in-
creases the resolving power between different materials. This paper presents results from the imaging of mock
cargo materials ranging from Z ≈ 5–92, demonstrating accurate reconstruction of the effective atomic number
and areal density of the materials over the full range. In particular, the system is capable of distinguishing
pure materials with Z & 70, such as lead and uranium — a critical requirement of a system designed to
detect SNM. This methodology could be used to screen commercial cargoes with high material specificity, to
distinguish most benign materials from SNM, such as uranium and plutonium.
I. INTRODUCTION
The field of nuclear security addresses the danger of
the nuclear weapons, including proliferation of weapon
technology, safeguards of fissile materials, and the risk of
nuclear terrorism. The latter topic encompasses cargo se-
curity, which specifically focuses on preventing the smug-
gling of nuclear materials and fully assembled nuclear
devices through ports of entry and other pathways. Es-
timates of the immediate economic costs alone of a nu-
clear explosion in a major port exceed $1 trillion, before
accounting for the substantial human costs1,2. Given the
relative anonymity of cargo shipping and its resulting vul-
nerability to smuggling, the lack of systems to efficiently
and reliably deter nuclear smuggling remains a relevant
security threat. This paper details the demonstration of a
new radiography technique for quantitatively identifying
materials in cargo that is capable of distinguishing dif-
ferent materials with high atomic number. Specifically,
the technique is capable of separating benign high-Z ma-
terials such as lead and tungsten from special nuclear
materials (SNM).
A. Detecting Nuclear Material in Cargo
Approximately 40000–57000 maritime shipping con-
tainers enter the United States every day3. This fast
throughput rate and the fact that many containers are
a)E-Mail: bhender1@mit.edu
densely packed to weights of up to 20 metric tons make
cargo containers particularly vulnerable to the smuggling
of nuclear materials or weapons. A system designed to
detect nuclear smuggling must simultaneously achieve
the following: scan cargo at .1 minute per container,
produce a low rate of false positives, and provide a clear
indicator of the presence of nuclear materials in diverse
cargo configurations (i.e., a low rate of false negatives).
Additionally, port operations restrict the footprint of
scanning systems, as well as the permissible radiation
dose to the cargo and surrounding area4,5.
Cargo screening technologies can be classified into
three categories: passive interrogation, active interroga-
tion, and radiography. Passive interrogation involves the
detection of the natural radioactivity of various parti-
cles — neutrons and photons in particular — from fissile
materials. In this context the materials of interest are
primarily weapons grade uranium (WGU), which con-
sists primarily of 235U, and weapons grade plutonium
(WGPu). The later primarily consists of 239Pu, but its
other isotopes (240Pu in particular) play a key role in its
passive signature.
Passive detection systems offer simplicity and rela-
tively low cost, and such systems have been deployed
widely in the United States and elsewhere. These systems
primarily consist of portals, which use various scintilla-
tors to detect photons in combination with 3He neutron
detectors to uncover SNM by their radioactive emissions
from nuclear decay and spontaneous fission. The ad-
dition of shielding around smuggled material, however,
circumvents passive detection. The passive signal from
WGU is very weak and easily shielded, while even an as-
sembled plutonium device (with its strong spontaneous
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fission neutron signature) may be shielded with combina-
tions of low- and high-Z material to block both neutron
and photon signals.
The limitations of passive detection techniques neces-
sitate alternative approaches. Active interrogation sys-
tems expose the cargo to a beam of one or more types of
particles (such as photons, neutrons, or muons) to trig-
ger secondary processes unique to fissionable and fissile
materials, producing signals which are strong enough to
overcome shielding attempts by a competent smuggler.
Examples of such systems include prompt neutrons from
photofission (PNPF)6, EZ3D7, and nuclear resonance flu-
orescence8. Furthermore, other groups related to this re-
search effort have advanced the detection of delayed neu-
trons from induced fission as a way of identifying fissile
materials9. While such techniques have promise due to
their specificity for SNM detection, no system has been
sufficiently developed for deployment at this time. For a
high level discussion of several active detection method-
ologies see Runkle, et al.10.
B. Radiography for SNM Detection
While searching for shielded fissile and fissionable ma-
terials via active methods is promising, shielding sce-
narios which completely block the signal are never-
theless possible. Radiographic imaging of cargo pro-
vides a means of detecting such scenarios. A variety
of radiographic techniques have been proposed in the
past, including using medium energy (∼GeV) protons11,
muons12–14, neutrons15–17, as well as ∼keV photons (X-
rays) and ∼MeV photons (gamma rays)18,19. Addition-
ally, radiographic imaging of cargo for SNM overlaps well
with other goals of cargo inspection (such as detection of
non-nuclear smuggling), adding value to the technique.
This work builds upon prior studies of using
4.4 and 15.1 MeV monochromatic photons from the
11B(d, nγ)12C reaction to radiograph objects and differ-
entiate between their material types20,21. A parallel ef-
fort by other groups, using Cherenkov detectors, have
used the same reaction to pursue a similar goal22. The
prior work however did not achieve a precise determina-
tion of the atomic number or areal density of the scanned
objects. This work demonstrates the ability to infer the
effective atomic number (Z) and areal density (ρA) of a
given spatial pixel across a cargo sample, providing essen-
tial information for the identification of materials present
in the cargo. This reconstruction is shown to be accu-
rate enough to distinguish between uranium and lead, a
critical result for SNM detection in that it permits dis-
tinguishing nuclear threats from benign materials. With
this capability, the system is robust against false alarm
scenarios in which benign high-Z materials (e.g., lead,
tungsten, precious metals) appear similar to SNM and
thus require further inspection.
In its simplest form radiography combines measure-
ments the transmitted photon flux φ for a given mate-
rial sample, knowledge of the incident flux φ0, and an
assumption of the mass attenuation coefficient µ of the
material to infer an approximate areal density ρA:
µρA = ln (φ0/φ) . (1)
This calculation can be performed for every pixel in a ra-
diographic scan to image the sample. By assuming that
µ does not vary through the scan plane, a relative value
of ρA can be reconstructed. It should be noted that µ
depends on the elemental composition of the material,
and thus is a function of effective atomic number Z. As
such, a measurement such as this cannot allow a simul-
taneous determination of effective atomic number Z and
areal density ρA, a requirement for distinguishing SNM
from benign cargo.
This goal can be achieved by using the energy depen-
dence of µ, and performing multiple measurements at
various energies. The main processes which contribute
to photon attenuation at 4.4 and 15.1 MeV are Compton
scattering and pair production. The mass attenuation
coefficient can be approximated as µ = µc + µpp, where
µc and µpp are the coefficients for Compton scattering
and pair production, respectively. Each of these coeffi-
cients depends on Z and the incident photon energy E
in different ways. Specifically,
µc = ZNAσc(E,Z)/A
µpp = NAσpp(E,Z)/A,
where NA is Avogadro’s number, A is the atomic weight
of the material under inspection, and the σ(E,Z) are
the cross sections of the relevant attenuation processes.
For photon energies satisfying E  511 keV, the cross
sections may be approximated as σc ∝ 1/E and σpp ∝
Z2f(Eγ), where f(Eγ) is a function of energy with neg-
ligible dependence on atomic number23. Using these as
inputs to the mass attenuation coefficients to compute
the transmission ratios (Equation 1) at two different en-
ergies (E0 and E1) results in
R =
ln (φ(E1)/φ0(E1))
ln (φ(E0)/φ0(E0))
=
Z2f(E1)NA · const1/A
ZNA · const2/AE0
= Z · E0f(E1)C, (2)
where C is a constant equal to the ratio const1/const2.
This treatment assumes that at E0 the mass attenuation
is entirely dominated by Compton scattering, while at
E1 pair production dominates. Assuming these require-
ments are met, an experimental measurement of R could
be used to directly determine the atomic number Z (and
the total attenuation used to infer the areal density ρA).
While this simple model requires broad approximations,
Equation 2 captures the essential mechanism by which
dual energy radiography may provide precise identifica-
tion of the effective Z of inspected materials.
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C. Monoenergetic Gamma Rays from Nuclear
Reactions
Dual energy radiography is by no means a new con-
cept. Current systems implement this technique by us-
ing bremsstrahlung beams with varying endpoints. Lin-
ear accelerator (linac) based bremsstrahlung dual energy
systems typically vary the electron beam energy between
two fixed values (e.g., 6 and 9 MeV)18,19. The transmit-
ted signals are compared in a way that allows quantita-
tive determination of the effective Z of a given pixel in
the cargo image24. Bremsstrahlung based systems, while
capable of rapidly producing images with excellent spa-
tial resolution using commercially-produced equipment,
have notable disadvantages. Most commercial linacs pro-
duce have a duty factor of ∼0.1%, producing pulses of
several µs length at O(102 Hz). The resulting large in-
stantaneous flux prevents measurement of the transmit-
ted spectrum and only an integrated measurement of the
total deposited energy is possible. This significantly re-
duces the information content of the signal, increasing
the number of photons (and thus radiation dose) required
to reconstruct the material type. Furthermore, most of
the energy of the beam flux is at low energies (.1 MeV).
Photons at these energies contribute to radiation dose,
but provide little to no transmitted information due to
the strong attenuation at low energies. For example, a
Geant425 simulation shows that a system based on a 6
MeV electron beam would produce approximately 90% of
the counts and 65% of the radiation dose from photons
≤3 MeV. This translates to a low information-to-dose
ratio. Finally, a significant number of photons undergo
scattering in the cargo but still reach the detectors, which
reduces the image contrast and dilutes the pixel-specific
Z-dependent information content.
Many of these factors can be overcome by replacing a
linac-based system with one which uses nuclear reactions
to produce monochromatic photons. The technique of
using monoenergetic gamma rays at several energies, re-
ferred to as multiple monoenergetic gamma radiography
(MMGR), provides several advantages over traditional
bremsstrahlung radiography. The knowledge of the pho-
ton energies and the measurement of transmitted spectral
data allows the suppression of events in the signal which
have undergone scattering, thus leaving only the photons
which have undergone direct line-of-sight transmission.
This creates a clean transmitted signal associated with
each pixel, highly dependent on the effective Z and areal
density of the intervening material. This work utilizes
the 11B(d,nγ)12C reaction to produce 4.4 and 15.1 MeV
photons, which arise from the short-lived excited levels of
12C in the final state of the reaction. The large spread in
energy between the two gamma rays in the source spec-
trum provide strong leverage for material identification.
II. EXPERIMENTAL METHODS
To test the capability of the MMGR technique, a mock
cargo scanning setup was constructed at the MIT-Bates
Research and Engineering Center, a schematic of which
is shown in Figure 1. This setup expanded upon previous
test experiments15,21 to permit the 2D imaging of mock
cargo materials. This included the installation of a mo-
tion system to move mock cargo materials through the
beam, an array of 32 detectors to provide position reso-
lution perpendicular to the direction of the motion, and
the addition of a number of beam and data diagnostics
to monitor the system over the course of a scan. This
section describes the key elements of the experiment and
mock cargo scenario for which data was collected.
RFQ
accelerator
HDPE, Pb
target shield Concrete
collimators
FIG. 1. Schematic of the mock cargo scanning experiment,
viewed from above21. The arrow associated with the mock
cargo label indicates the direction of motion of the cargo
across the scan.
A. Gamma Ray Beam
The 4.4 and 15.1 MeV photons used to radiograph ma-
terials were generated by impinging a 3 MeV deuteron
(d+) beam on a thick natural boron target, contain-
ing 80.1% 11B. Given the relative cross sections of the
11B(d,nγ)12C for the 4.4 and 15.1 MeV gammas at this
energy, the beam on target produced the two gammas in
approximately a 4:1 ratio26,27. The deuterons were ac-
celerated using an Accsys Technologies DL-3 Radio Fre-
quency Quadruple (RFQ) accelerator, and the target was
mounted to the output port of the RFQ. The accelerator
operated at a frequency of 300 Hz, producing deuteron
beam pulses of approximately 20 µs (0.6% duty factor)
as shown in Figure 3. Thus, while the time average
deuteron current during experiments was approximately
10 µA, the instantaneous current during the beam pulses
reached ∼1.7 mA.
The reactions at the target generated gamma rays ap-
proximately isotropically27. Thus, high-density concrete
collimators were used to create a fan beam extending
vertically with an illumination width of 2.38 cm in the
horizontal direction at the location of the mock cargo.
Additionally, 53 cm of borated high density polyethylene
(HDPE) was placed directly downstream of the target
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(encompassing the entire fan beam) to block neutrons
and low energy photons from secondary reactions in the
target. Figure 2 shows the spectrum of the beam mea-
sured at low event rate to show the key features, including
the 4.4 MeV and 15.1 MeV gammas. An additional con-
tributions is visible at 1.7 MeV (from 11B(d,pγ)12B and
peaks between 6 and 9 MeV result from thermal neutron
capture in the detectors and surrounding materials. See
O’Day, et al.21 for an extended discussion of the beam
components.
FIG. 2. Sample spectrum measured in the NaI (Tl) detectors
with an iron sample in the beam and ∼1 µA deuteron current,
so as to show the features with high resolution. See O’Day, et
al.21 for a discussion of the labeled elements of the spectrum.
B. Detectors
The transmitted spectra were measured using a verti-
cal array of 32 Saint-Gobain 2X4H16/2SS NaI(Tl) scin-
tillator detector packages28. The detectors consisted of
2 ′′ × 4 ′′ × 16 ′′ thallium-doped sodium iodide crystals
instrumented with 2 ′′ photomultiplier tubes. The large
size and appreciable energy resolution of these detectors
allowed the selection of directly transmitted monoener-
getic photons, providing critical information for preci-
sion material identification. The high voltage and gain
controls were manually adjusted for each detector to ap-
proximately match their responses, although further en-
ergy calibration (gain) corrections were applied in anal-
ysis (see Section IIIA 1). The array was constructed so
that the long axis of the detectors was parallel to the
beam axis and the short axis was along the vertical di-
rection to maximize the vertical spatial resolution of the
detector array. The detector array was placed such that
the upstream faces of the detectors were 9.35 m from the
boron target (or approximately 5.81 m from the mock
cargo). This resulted in approximately 3 cm vertical res-
olution for the cargo imaging. The horizontal extent of
the detectors perpendicular to the beam was wider than
the collimation, and thus did not significantly affect the
imaging resolution.
C. Data Acquisition
The detector pulses were processed using CAEN V1725
digitizer modules operating in digital pulse processing
pulse shape discrimination (DPP-PSD) mode29. The sys-
tem was configured such that the trigger threshold for
each detector approximately corresponded to a 1 MeV en-
ergy deposition. The pulse integration window for each
trigger was 1 µs. Note that unlike standard radiogra-
phy systems, which operate in charge integrating mode,
the system described here recorded individual waveforms
with timing and pulse shape information available for
each detection. This allowed the use of several analysis
techniques described in Section III to increase the res-
olution of the system in effective Z and areal density.
The digitizer output was processed using an extension to
the ADAQ analysis framework to produce data files for
analysis30.
D. Mock Cargo Test Configuration
To utilize this system as a cargo scanning prototype, a
motion system installed between the concrete collimators
(as shown in Figure 1) moved materials samples placed
on a cart (shown in Figure 9) across the fan beam over
the course of an experimental run. Data were collected
as a function of time, which, when paired with the known
motion of the materials and the vertical resolution of the
detector array, allowed the 2D imaging of the mock cargo
materials. The materials tested were chosen to so as to
span a large range of effective Z (∼5–82) and to include a
stand-in for SNM (natural uranium rods with aluminum
cladding—see Appendix A). The areal densities of the
materials were chosen so as to approximate typical total
areal densities present in commercial cargo containers.
Table I summarizes the parameters of the materials sam-
ples.
Section IV presents results from two distinct experi-
mental runs using the same materials samples: one in
which the cargo was moved across the beam at 0.0077
cm/s and one in which the cargo was moved at 0.308 (4x
the speed of the first test). These are referred to as the
7400 s and 2000 s scans respectively. Additionally, the
data could be sampled to considerably finer time reso-
lution (4 ns), permitting the oversampling of the data
relative to the collimator width to improve the horizon-
tal position resolution of the reconstruction. Analyses
were conducted using 1 cm and 1 mm pixel widths, as
discussed in Sections III and IV. Note that while these
scan times are considerably longer than would be feasi-
ble for a deployed cargo scanner, the relevant quantity is
the integrated deuteron beam current delivered on target
per unit scan distance, since scan times may be reduced
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by increasing the beam current. In the 7400 s run, the
beam charge delivered was 1.3 mC/cm of scan length
(at 10 µA of average beam current). This would corre-
spond to scan times of ∼100 s for full sized containers
with 1 mA average beam current. Such currents would
likely be achievable using a purpose-designed accelerator
(operating with continuous wave current).
III. ANALYSIS
To reconstruct the effective Z and areal density of the
mock cargo, the transmitted gamma ray spectra were
compared to the expected spectra based on a detailed
simulation model of the experiment. The data spectra
were collected over fixed increments of the scan length
for each detector channel to create “pixels” for the ma-
terial reconstruction. Similarly to standard radiography
techniques, the analysis consisted of comparing the trans-
mitted spectra with materials in the beam to that of the
“open” beam, i.e., when no materials were present in the
bean other than the fixed components of the setup de-
scribed in Section II. This comparison provides informa-
tion of the total attenuation of the beam due to the mate-
rial as well as the energy dependence of this attenuation,
which provides sufficient information to reconstruct the
total areal density and effective atomic number of the
materials.
The simulation model was used to generate a library
of materials over the complete space of Z = 4–92 and
areal density ρA = 20–250 g/cm2. The use of the simu-
lation library allowed for the reconstruction of the cargo
materials without empirical calibration based on addi-
tional datasets and provided a means of directly account-
ing for detector response and efficiency, collimation of
the beam, multiple/down-scattering of transmitted pho-
tons, and other elements of the physical setup. This sec-
tion describes the procedures applied to prepare the data
spectra for comparison with the simulated transmission
library, the simulation model, and the analysis used to ex-
tract the effective Z and areal density of the mock cargo.
A. Spectrum Corrections
Several corrections were applied to the raw spectra,
both to ensure consistency across an imaging scan and
to select the relevant data for comparison with the simu-
lation model. Unlike traditional gamma/x-ray cargo ra-
diography systems, which utilize integration mode detec-
tors to cope with the high photon flux of bremsstrahlung
beams32, the lower absolute photon flux of the nuclear
reaction based photon beam here permits use of detec-
tors in counting mode. This makes it possible to record
the complete energy dependence of the transmitted spec-
tra. This spectral information allows individual recorded
events to be associated with the initial photon energy and
thus more accurate determination of the attenuation of
the beam due to the cargo at the specific beam energies.
To produce spectra representative of the transmission of
the monoenergetic photons, several corrections must be
applied to the raw spectra. The corrections are described
as follows in the order they were applied to the raw data.
1. Gain Drift Correction
As the experiment operated in a non-climate controlled
warehouse, the NaI (Tl) detectors were subject to gain
drift on the order of several percent over the course of
each scan. Since the analysis depends on the measure-
ment of counts recorded in specific energy regions of the
data spectra, a fixed calibration of ADC counts to de-
posited energy for a detector would cause systematic er-
ror for each energy bin. To prevent this, the raw spec-
trum of each detector at each position step in the scan
was used to determine the ADC-to-energy calibration at
that specific step using the monoenergetic peaks present
in the spectra to produce energy spectra that could be
compared on equal footing.
2. Beam Timing Cut
The pulsed nature of the deuteron beam provided a
means of suppressing many of the background contribu-
tions to the raw detected spectra. Since the lifetimes of
the excited states of 12C that gave rise to the 4.4 and 15.1
MeV photons in the target are O (10−13 s), events from
the gamma rays of interest were recorded promptly in
coincidence with beam pulses. Gating on the beam pulse
timing allowed for suppression of background events due
to longer-lived excited states and thermal neutrons. In
particular, bremsstrahlung photons arising from the beta
decay of 12B (produced by neutron capture on 11B in the
target) contributed significantly to the raw signal up to
6.9 MeV. Given that the beta decay of 12B has a lifetime
of ∼20 ms, however, ∼99.9% of its contribution to the
raw spectra may be eliminated by selecting only events
in the beam pulse time windows.
Since no timing information was recorded for the beam
pulses during data taking and the exact frequency of the
accelerator deviated slightly from 300 Hz, the pulse fre-
quency was reconstructed by computing the mean time
of concentrations of events in the detectors over many
pulses. A symmetric 20 µs window around the recon-
structed pulse center was selected for the timing cut, as
shown in Figure 3. Figure 4 shows the spectrum of the
open beam inside and outside the timing cut, showing
that the inclusion of events outside the time cut would
contribute ∼10% error to the estimated counts in the 4.4
MeV region. Notably, the 4.4 MeV signal remains visible
in the off-pulse spectrum. This is due to the fact that
the beta decay of 12B frequently creates the 12C 4.4 MeV
excited state33,34. Additionally visible are small peaks
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Material Effective Z Density Width × Height Depth Areal Density (ρA)
(g/cm3) (cm×cm) (cm) (g/cm2)
Borated HDPE ∼5.2 1.02 20.3× 23.1 45.30 46.2
Aluminum (Al) 13 2.70 20.3× 24.5 20.25 54.7
Copper (Cu) 29 8.96 10.1× 10.1 5.45 48.8
Tin (Sn) 50 7.31 10.1× 10.1 6.74 49.3
Tungsten (W) 74 19.30 10.1× 10.1 2.56 49.4
Lead (Pb) 82 11.35 20.3× 20.3 5.08 57.7
Uranium rods ∼65 12.72 13.8× 21.2 5.50 ∼55
TABLE I. Parameters of the materials samples used for the imaging test, the arrangement of which is shown in Figure 9. The
effective Z value listed for the borated HDPE is computed as the average elemental composition of the material weighted by
the contribution to the electron density by each element, since Compton scattering dominates the photon interactions at the
energies of interest for the light nuclei comprising the material31. Values listed for the uranium rods are averaged over the
arrangement of the 10 rods. See Appendix A for explanation of the effective Z and areal density for the uranium rods.
from the capture of thermal neutrons on hydrogen (2.2
MeV) and a longer lived excited state of 12B (1.7 MeV)35.
FIG. 3. Reconstructed beam pulse shape, time behavior of
the after pulse events, and cut window applied to select only
prompt events associated with beam pulses (dashed lines).
3. Beam Current Correction
Any unaccounted for variation in the deuteron current
(and thus the beam flux) between the open beam and
the subsequent measurements would caused an error in
the transmission measurement directly proportional to
the current variation. As noted in Section II, a charge
integrator was used to monitor the beam current incident
on the boron target over the course of each imaging scan.
The beam current varied by up to ∼10% during the imag-
ing tests, primarily due to instabilities in the deuteron
source and accelerator. The data from this channel were
used to renormalize the data spectra at each position
step. Note that only the relative beam current at each
scan step is required, rather than an absolute calibration,
FIG. 4. Spectra of the open beam during and outside the
beam pulse window (lower histogram, color online), with pile-
up corrections applied (see Section IIIA 4). Events outside
the pulses contributed approximately 13% of all raw counts,
after correction for pile-up (Section IIIA 4).
since the analysis utilizes only the relative transmission
between cargo-in-beam and the open beam. While an
approximate calibration of the current was known, any
uncertainty in its value does not significantly affect the
reconstruction of the materials.
4. Pile-Up/Dead-Time Correction
The large size of the NaI (Tl) detectors in combination
with the high instantaneous current of the pulsed RFQ
beam resulted in a significant number of “pile-up” events
in the raw spectra (i.e., single spectrum counts represent-
ing the energy deposition of two or more individual pho-
tons in the same pulse integration period). These pile-up
events significantly distort the open beam spectrum. In
particular, such events add an excess of events at higher
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energies from the summation of two lower energy depo-
sitions. While standard radiography systems operating
with integration mode detectors are not subject to this
issue, the analysis described here — which utilizes spec-
tral information — must carefully account for this effect.
A pulse shape discrimination (PSD) algorithm was
used to identify such pile-up events in data. The “tail-
over-total” PSD method, frequently used to separate
gamma ray and neutron events in organic scintillators
due to their differing scintillation decay time scales36,
may also be used to identify pile-up events. In this
method, the charge integrated by the ADC for a PMT
waveform is separated into “head” and “tail” portions at
a a fixed amount following the trigger. An energy deposi-
tion of any value resulting from a single event should ex-
hibit roughly the same “tail-over-total” ratio, correspond-
ing to the decay time of the scintillator. Integration win-
dows with pile-up events will show an excess in the tail
portion of pulse integration due to the contribution of
the second pulse.
For the imaging scans, the pulse integration period was
fixed at 1 µs, and the tail region was defined to be approx-
imately the last 50% of the pulse following the trigger.
The 2D histogram of the tail fraction and the total en-
ergy deposition for a single detector over the course of
one of the data runs is shown in Figure 5. For each en-
ergy bin in each detector, a Gaussian profile was fit to
the central tail/total ratio peak to produce a cut at 3σ
for each energy bin in each detector to reject events as
pile-up. The resulting cut region on the PSD parameter
for an example detector is also shown in Figure 5.
Rejecting events identified as pile-up, however, intro-
duces an effective deadtime to the measurement (since
no counts are accepted in an integration window with
pile-up). Since the presence of material in the beam
significantly affects the pile-up rate, the pile-up rejected
spectra on their own are not representative of the actual
transmitted flux compared to the open beam. For the
open beam, approximately 70% of recorded energy depo-
sitions were rejected due to pile-up (after correction for
the Gaussian cut boundaries). Since each of these pile-up
events represents at least two individual photons, use of
the uncorrected pile-up rejected spectrum would result
in underestimating the true flux by >500%, and would
introduce similarly large errors in the transmission ratio.
Due to the long integration window, pile-up deadtime
dominated the total effective deadtime. Additional data
acquisition and processing time added 1% to the ef-
fective deadtime, and was not included as a significant
correction.
To account for this, a pile-up correction was devised.
Given that individual true events are independent, the
true energy spectrum of counts that are recorded in the
pile-up portion of the data matches the energy spectrum
of the counts that occurred without pile-up, up to sec-
ondary effects such as small additional energy pile-up and
associated trigger bias. Thus the desired correction may
be approximated as a scaling factor that is applied to
FIG. 5. Two-dimensional “tail-over-total” PSD histogram
(log10 counts) for the raw spectrum of the open beam. The
bright band at a ratio of ∼0.55 represents windows with a
single detected photon. The curved bands away from the
main band show pile-up events, in which additional energy is
added to the common monoenergetic depositions (above the
main band) or in which a monoenergetic event occurs close
enough to the end of a trigger window for its tail to cause
another trigger (below the main band). The region between
the magenta lines indicates the pile-up cut region.
the pile-up rejected (“clean”) spectrum. Since the true
rate of individual events r is unknown, and the resolving
time of the detector τ may also be unknown, it is most
useful to express the standard formulation of pile-up37 as
a function of the fraction f of total counts captured in
the pile-up rejected spectrum. For the long, fixed ADC
integration window used in this experiment, the dead-
time was was of a non-paralyzable nature. As derived in
Appendix B, the true spectrum N may thus be recon-
structed from the pile-up rejected spectrum NC as:
N = NC
(
1− ln f
f
)
. (3)
This correction was applied to each time/position step of
the image scans to account for variation in the pile-up
rate over the course of the experiments.
B. Simulation Model
A complete simulation model of the experiment was
constructed, including all relevant aspects of the exper-
iment, to compute simulated transmission spectra for a
wide variety of materials that could be directly compared
to the data. By using such a model, the need for em-
pirical calibration of the system with sample data from
many materials was avoided. The simulation model was
constructed using the Geant4 toolkit25, and included all
important physical materials present in the experiment
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(the neutron shield in the beamline, the collimators, the
detectors, etc.) at positions surveyed during data taking.
Photons originating at the boron target were propagated
through the geometry (including any simulated cargo ma-
terial) to the model detectors, which included simulated
responses — resolution, efficiency, etc. — modeled ac-
cording to dedicated empirical tests.
The simulated beam was generated by simulating the
five major monoenergetic beam components shown in
Figure 2 (1.7, 4.4, 6.7, 8.9, and 15.1 MeV) for fixed ge-
ometries, and determining their relative contribution to
the beam using an empirical fit to data taken in dedicated
experiments. The resulting simulated spectra for each
monoenergetic contribution were convolved with the sim-
ulated detector response, and then the relative strength
of each contribution was fit so as to best match the corre-
sponding data. The results of the fit for the open beam is
shown in Figure 6. Note that while the analysis depends
only on relative transmission, this beam model accounts
for the contributions in 4.4 MeV region due to down-
scatter and incomplete energy deposition in the detectors
from higher energy photons to increase the accuracy of
the analysis. Figure 7 shows the simulation prediction for
the transmission spectrum for a copper sample of ρA ≈ 49
g/cm2. This prediction is based on propagation of the re-
constructed open beam (Figure 6) through a simulated
material sample using Geant4. These predicted spectra
were compared to the data spectra to reconstruct mate-
rials, as described in Section III C.
FIG. 6. The simulation spectrum fit to an open beam data
sample taken using a single NaI (Tl) detector (color online).
The individual simulated contribution magnitudes, detector
model parameters, and background model were fit to best
match the data for each sample.
Approximately 5000 simulated transmission experi-
ments were generated to create a library of expected de-
tected spectra over the complete two-dimensional space
of Z = 4–92 and ρA = 20–250 g/cm2, in addition to the
open beam configuration. As described in Section III C,
FIG. 7. Comparison of the data spectrum from a pixel in the
copper region of the 2000 s scan to the simulation prediction
based on the fit to the open beam spectrum of Figure 6, given
knowledge of the material in the beam at the time.
this simulation library was compared to the transmission
data to estimate the areal density and effective Z of each
pixel in a scan.
C. Radiographic Reconstruction
With data and simulation spectra prepared, the trans-
mission ratios for each data and simulation spectrum
were computed in the regions of the 4.4 MeV and 15.1
MeV peaks. For each spectrum (with the simulation and
data treated in the same manner), the counts between
2.8 MeV and 5.0 MeV (so as to encompass the full de-
position and escape peaks of the 4.4 MeV photons) were
integrated to compute N4, while all counts above 10.1
MeV were integrated to produce N15 (since essentially
all counts above this energy were due to incomplete en-
ergy depositions of 15.1 MeV photons). The simulation
was run with no mock cargo to produce an open beam
spectrum for the transmission calculation, while the data
runs used the open beam spectra collected during the
first and last portions of the run (normalized to the inte-
grated current of one pixel). The transmission ratios in
each energy bin E were defined as
RE =
NE
NE,open
, (4)
where the NE,open are the integrated counts for the ap-
propriate open beam spectra, after applying the correc-
tions discussed in Section IIIA.
With the transmission ratios for the data and simu-
lation spectra in the regions of interest determined, a
figure of merit F was constructed to determine the sim-
ulated combination of Z and ρA that best matched the
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data spectrum. The quantity was constructed using ra-
tios of the transmission ratios (Equation 4) in the 4.4 and
15.1 MeV regions to construct a quantity robust against
a number of systematic uncertainties. For each pixel, the
data spectrum was compared to each element of the sim-
ulated material library with effective Z and ρA according
to
F (Z, ρA) =
(
R15,data
R15,sim (Z, ρA)
− 1
)2
+
(
R4,data/R15,data
R4,sim (Z, ρA)/R15,sim (Z, ρA)
− 1
)2
. (5)
This metric was motivated by the fact that the signal in
the 15.1 MeV region was very clean due to the absence
of high energy backgrounds in the data and the fact that
the ratio-of-ratios between the 4.4 and 15.1 MeV regions
provides strong material discrimination while canceling
certain systematic uncertainties. The values of Z and ρA
corresponding to the minimum of F were assigned as the
reconstructed values for each pixel, noting that a perfect
match between the measured and simulated transmission
results in F = 0. Figure 8 shows examples of the recon-
struction for a low-Z material (Al) and a high-Z material
(W).
IV. RESULTS
To produce images of the mock cargo in effective Z
and areal density, the data spectra were grouped into 1
cm pixels along the scan length. For each pixel, the ra-
diographic analysis described in Section III was applied
to produce the images in effective Z and areal density
ρA. Figure 9 shows the results for the 7400 s scan. In
addition to the pixel-by-pixel estimate, regions were de-
fined according the boxes shown in the reconstruction
images to quantitatively evaluate the performance of the
analysis for each material. For each region, the average
reconstructed Z and ρA were computed for comparison
to the known true values. These results are summarized
in Tables II and III for the 7400 s and 2000 s scans,
respectively. The standard deviation of each estimated
pixel value was used as a measure of the uncertainty on
the values reconstructed for each individual pixel, which
were then used to compute the uncertainties on the over-
all mean reconstructed values.
The reconstructed values are very close to the true val-
ues in both of the imaging tests, showing the robustness
of the system and analysis to environmental drift effects
(e.g., temperature changes) and the statistics of the data
(the 7400 s run included approximately 4 times as many
counts in the transmission spectra per pixel as the 2000 s
run). It should also be noted that while the absolute
values are close to the true values, there are residual sta-
tistically significant differences. This indicates that fur-
ther improvements to the reconstruction algorithms or
control of systematic uncertainties are possible, and thus
should be part of future work. Despite this limitation, the
specificity of the monoenergetic beam transmission pro-
vides effective atomic number identification with speci-
ficity of ±3 in Z and thus permits separation of different
high-Z materials, which is typically not possible in exist-
ing radiography systems. For example, the tungsten and
lead samples are well separated in reconstructed atomic
number, while the areal density reconstruction is also ac-
curate for each material to within a few g/cm2. This
suggests that pure special nuclear materials (Z ≥ 92)
could be separated from benign high-Z materials such as
lead and tungsten, which would be invaluable for reduc-
ing false alarms in a system designed to detect nuclear
smuggling.
The results for the mixed material uranium rods merit
further discussion. Due to the fact that the rods consist
of aluminum and uranium, and additionally because they
are not uniform in areal density as presented to the beam,
evaluation of the reconstruction of the material parame-
ters for the rods is not as straightforward as for the pure
materials. Appendix A details rough estimates of the ex-
pected effective Z and areal density for the arrangement
of the rods, up to the limited information available about
the exact composition of the rods. Due to the fact that
the 1 cm pixel size in Figure 9 obscures the structures pre-
dicted by the results in Figure 12, it is useful to consider
1 mm pixels for the uranium rod sample despite the re-
duction in statistics. Figure 10 shows the reconstructed
Z and ρA for the rods with 1 mm pixels. While the
areal density is slightly overestimated in the 1 mm pixels
(due to low statistics), the images in Figure 10 clearly
show the structure of the rod arrangement (Figure 11),
and show that extra spacing between the rightmost rods
in combination with the uncertainty on the rod compo-
sition is likely responsible for the discrepancies between
the reconstructed Z and ρA values and the estimates from
Appendix A. This mixed material example demonstrates
the limitations of 2D radiographic imaging to determine
the material composition of cargo, but with sufficient po-
sition resolution the presence of high-Z material is still
clearly evident.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
The results presented here establish the use of multi-
ple monoenergetic gamma ray radiography (MMGR) to
image materials in both their effective atomic number
and areal density. Most notably, the technique distin-
guishes pure materials even at high-Z (e.g., separating
Pb and W or Pb and U), a critical requirement of any
system designed to detect SNM and differentiate it from
benign high-Z materials, which could otherwise result in
false positive detections. The specific information trans-
mitted by the monochromatic beam, combined with high
resolution detectors to clearly identify directly transmit-
ted photons, provides the capability to identify materi-
als while minimizing the radiation dose delivered to the
9
FIG. 8. Two examples of the data/simulation comparison metric F (Equation 5) as a function of Z and ρA over the simulation
library. Examples from the aluminum (left) and tungsten (right) regions of the 7400 s test are shown. The crossing dashed
lines indicate the minimum of F in each plot, showing the reconstructed Z and ρA values.
FIG. 9. Images of the mock cargo in reconstructed effective Z and areal density for the 7400 s test (∼1.3 mC integrated
deuteron beam current on target per cm of the scan). The magenta boxes show the regions used to define each material sample
for the computation of the values in Table II.
cargo.
The results for the natural uranium rods demonstrate
the fundamental limitations of this technique, and in-
deed radiography of any kind, as a method for detect-
ing SNM. The several mm of aluminum cladding sig-
nificantly reduces the effective Z of the configuration,
somewhat masking the presence of the uranium. With
sufficient position resolution, however, the presence of
very high-Z (>80) material can be flagged for this con-
figuration. This suggests that monoenergetic gamma ray
radiography may be paired with a secondary technique
(such as a system designed to detect induced photofission
neutrons6,22) to disambiguate such situations. Addition-
ally, future work will explore the resolving power of ra-
diography using multiple projections for mixed material
configurations.
A concern that has been raised regarding high en-
ergy gamma radiography techniques is the resulting ra-
diological activation of inspected materials. Photons at
15.1 MeV have enough energy to induce (γ, n) photo-
disintegration reactions in many elements, and may in-
directly become a source of neutrons. The capture of
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Material Actual Z Reconstructed Z Single Pixel Unc. Actual ρA Reconstructed ρA Single Pixel Unc.
(g/cm2) (g/cm2) (g/cm2)
Borated HDPE ∼5.2 4.7± 0.1 (1.4) 46.2 60.5± 0.5 (5.3)
Aluminum (Al) 13 12.0± 0.2 (2.1) 54.7 55.8± 0.6 (7.2)
Copper (Cu) 29 27.5± 1.1 (5.6) 48.8 48.0± 1.2 (6.0)
Tin (Sn) 50 49.1± 2.9 (14.0) 49.3 45.0± 1.3 (6.2)
Tungsten (W) 74 75.3± 3.3 (15.1) 49.4 50.0± 1.7 (8.0)
Lead (Pb) 82 83.2± 0.9 (9.3) 57.7 56.8± 0.4 (4.5)
Uranium rods ∼65 55.5± 2.3 (19.3) ∼55 61.3± 0.8 (7.0)
TABLE II. Reconstructed effective Z and areal density values for the mock cargo materials for the 7400 s test (∼1.3 mC
integrated deuteron beam current on target per cm of the scan). Quoted uncertainty after the “±” represents the uncertainty
on the average over the material region, while the single pixel uncertainty is the standard deviation of the single pixel (1 cm×1
detector) estimates over the region. See Figure 9 for the definition of each sample region.
Material Actual Z Reconstructed Z Single Pixel Unc. Actual ρA Reconstructed ρA Single Pixel Unc.
(g/cm2) (g/cm2) (g/cm2)
Borated HDPE ∼5.2 5.9± 0.2 (2.4) 46.2 61.7± 0.7 (7.9)
Aluminum (Al) 13 12.4± 0.4 (4.6) 54.7 53.8± 0.9 (10.0)
Copper (Cu) 29 28.2± 1.3 (6.6) 48.8 47.8± 1.2 (5.9)
Tin (Sn) 50 49.7± 3.3 (16.1) 49.3 46.5± 1.5 (7.1)
Tungsten (W) 74 75.8± 3.8 (18.4) 49.4 47.7± 1.8 (8.9)
Lead (Pb) 82 80.9± 1.7 (18.1) 57.7 65.1± 2.2 (23.4)
Uranium rods ∼65 59.4± 2.5 (20.5) ∼55 63.2± 2.0 (16.5)
TABLE III. Reconstructed effective Z and areal density values for the mock cargo materials for the 2000 s test (∼0.33 mC
integrated deuteron beam current on target per cm of the scan). Quoted uncertainty after the “±” represents the uncertainty
on the average over the material region, while the single pixel uncertainty is the standard deviation of the single pixel (1 cm×1
detector) estimates over the region.
these secondary neutrons can transmute stable isotopes
into metastable ones and induce long-lived radioactivity
in the inspected materials. Calculations show, however,
that the exposure to the neutrons produced by the above
reaction amounts to just one hour of exposure to cos-
mogenic neutrons from the natural background, and as
such any contributions to induced radioactivity is negligi-
ble when compared naturally occurring activation. This
calculation is detailed in Appendix C.
The experimental setup used here would require signif-
icant modifications for deployment as a cargo scanning
system, several of which are the subject of ongoing work.
As discussed at the end of Section II, the scan times of
several thousand seconds used in this work would be re-
duced to .2 minutes by operating at mA-scale current.
The results presented here demonstrate the ability of a
radiography system to function in counting mode at such
currents using the pile-up correction technique detailed
in Section IIIA 4. In such a system, another technique
would likely need to be devised to account for the back-
ground subtraction conducted here using timing informa-
tion. Additionally, the use of alternate nuclear reactions
such as 12C(p, p′γ)12C and 16O(p, p′γ)16O, which produce
monoenergetic gamma rays between 4.4 and 8.9 MeV,
would open a variety of options for different accelerators
and significantly reduce the neutrons that are present
from other processes in a system using 11B(d,nγ)12C.
Work is ongoing to establish the applicability of the tech-
niques for precision material identification described in
this paper using the lower energy photons available from
such reactions.
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Appendix A: Calculation of the Uranium Rod
Effective Z and Areal Density
As described in Section IID, the mock cargo objects
for the imaging demonstration results in this paper con-
sisted of approximately uniform density pure elemental
materials except for the natural uranium rods. These
rods, used on loan from the MIT Nuclear Reactor Lab-
oratory, consisted of cylinders of natural uranium metal
clad with 0.3 cm of aluminum (for a total diameter of
2.75 cm). For the imaging test, 10 of these rods were
arranged in two rows of five as shown in Figure 11.
FIG. 11. Arrangement of the 10 natural uranium rods used in
the imaging test, viewed from above. The beam was incident
in the +zˆ direction.
Due to the fact that there was no means of verifying the
internal composition of the rods, the following calcula-
tions assume that the uranium metal inside the cladding
was of uniform density 19.3 g/cm3. Given this assump-
tion, it is possible to compute the areal density along the
beam path across the arrangement of the rods. To com-
pare to the imaging results, however, the averaging effect
of the finite collimator width must be considered. At the
position of the mock cargo, the collimation produced a
beam width of approximately 2.4 cm. A sliding average
over this width was applied to the exact calculation of
the areal density to produce the expected reconstructed
areal density, shown in Figure 12.
Computation of the expected effective Z requires con-
sideration of the nature of the beam and physical pro-
cesses that contribute to the attenuation of the beam for
the aluminum and uranium combinations across the ar-
rangement. To estimate this value, the photon mass at-
tenuation coefficients (µρ ) for the uranium and aluminum
combinations across the configuration were estimated as
functions of energy according to
µ
ρ
= wU ·
(
µ
ρ
)
U
+ (1− wU) ·
(
µ
ρ
)
Al
, (A1)
where wU is the uranium mass fraction at a given posi-
tion, as computed above, and the attenuation coefficient
values for the individual elements provided by the NIST
x-ray mass attenuation coefficient database38. For each
position in the configuration, the pure element with at-
tenuation coefficient values at 4.4 MeV and 15.1 MeV
best matching the rod attenuation coefficients as com-
puted by Equation A1 was used as an estimate of the
effective value of Z at that position. The results of this
estimate, averaged over the beam illumination width, are
also shown in Figure 12.
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FIG. 12. Expected reconstructed areal density (left) and effective Z (right) of the uranium rod arrangement along the beam
path, accounting for the loss of resolution due to the 2.38 cm width of the beam.
Appendix B: Calculation of the Pile-Up
Correction Factor
In this appendix, the scaling factor that must be
applied to a pile-up rejected (“clean”) spectrum with
counts NC is computed for both paralyzable and non-
paralyzable deadtime scenarios. Since the true rate of
individual events r is unknown, and the resolving time
of the detector τ may also be unknown, it is most useful
to express the correction as a function of the fraction of
total counts captured in the pile-up rejected spectrum f
(i.e., the “clean” fraction of events).
To compute the correction, let Nrec be the total num-
ber of recorded counts (including pile-up rejected counts),
Nc be the number of counts recorded cleanly without
pile-up, and Npu be the number of counts in the pile-
up portion of the spectrum (or the number of rejected
counts). That is, Nrec = Nc+Npu). The number of true
counts N may then be expressed as
N = Nc +Npu · n, (B1)
where n is the mean number of true counts per pile-up
count. Since the clean spectrum represents the correct
shape of the true spectrum, it is useful to express Equa-
tion B1 as a scaling of the number of clean counts as the
fraction f = NcNrec of the total recorded counts that they
represent:
N = Nc
(
1 +
Nrec −Nc
Nc
· n
)
= Nc
(
1 +
1− f
f
· n
)
.
(B2)
The true spectrum may then be recovered by scaling the
extracted clean spectrum, given the mean number of true
counts per pile-up count n. Let P (j) be the probability
that given a single true event, j additional events are
recorded as piled-up with the original event (i.e., j =
0 represents a cleanly recorded event). Then the mean
number of counts per piled-up count is:
n =
1∑∞
j=1 P (j)
∞∑
j=1
(j + 1)P (j) =
1
1− f
∞∑
j=1
(j + 1)P (j),
(B3)
since the term in the denominator is simply the prob-
ability that the original count accumulates at least one
additional count when recorded.
The following sections compute n as a function of f
for the cases of non-paralyzable and paralyzable detector
and data acquisition systems, re-expressing the standard
results for pile-up rates37 to eliminate need for knowledge
of the true detector rates and resolving times.
1. Non-Paralyzable Case
For a non-paralyzable detector and data acquisition
system exposed to a true rate of incident events r with
an integration time of τ per recorded event, the probabil-
ity P (j) of j true events following a given event trigger
within the same trigger window is governed by the Pois-
son distribution37:
P (j) =
(rτ)
j
j!
e−rτ . (B4)
Combining Equations B3 and B4 for the non-paralyzable
case yields
nNP =
e−rτ
1− f
∞∑
j=1
(j + 1)
(rτ)
j
j!
. (B5)
Noting that exp(x) =
∑∞
j=0 x
j/j!, the sums reduce to
nNP =
1
1− f
(
1− e−rτ + rτ) . (B6)
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As noted, it is most useful to recast the expression as a
function of the fraction of the total counts in the pile-up
rejected spectrum f = P (0) = e−rτ , to yield
nNP = 1− ln f
1− f . (B7)
Note that nNP monotonically increases with the piled-up
fraction (1−f) and limf→1 nNP = 2, i.e., piled-up events
contain a negligible fraction of multiple pile-up (j > 1)
as the pile-up rate goes to zero.
2. Extending Case
In the paralyzable case, the arrival of each new true
event resets the integration time τ per event, leading to
a greater probability of accumulating j > 1 piled-up true
events along with the event that initialized the trigger.
The probability of j events piling-up with a given sin-
gle event which initializes a trigger for the paralyzable
system case is37
P (j) = e−rτ
(
1− e−rτ)j . (B8)
Note that, as in the non-paralyzable case, f = P (0) =
e−rτ . Combining Equations B3 and B8 yields
nP =
f
1− f
∞∑
j=1
(j + 1) (1− f)j . (B9)
Since 0 ≤ f ≤ 1, the sum is an arithmetico-geometric
series:
nP = 1 +
1
f
. (B10)
This quantity also approaches n = 2 for f → 1 like Equa-
tion B7, but increases much more rapidly as f goes to
zero, as expected for the extended integration window.
Appendix C: Neutrons from the (γ, n) reactions
The 15.1 MeV photons in the presented system have
energies well above the photodisintegration thresholds for
a number of common materials, and thus can produce
neutrons via the X(γ, n)Y reaction. The resulting radi-
ological activation of inspected materials resulting from
transmutation of nuclei into unstable isotopes as these
neutrons are captured has been a commonly cited con-
cern regarding the use of high energy gamma rays for
cargo inspection39. To understand the scale of this ef-
fect, it is useful to estimate the production rate for these
neutrons and compare it to the rate of exposure to cos-
mogenic neutrons.
As an example, consider the case of a plate of steel 2.4
m tall, undergoing a scan at the speed of 40 cm/s with
15.1 MeV photons. The rate of neutron production in
the steel is
N =
σNA
A
φ0
1
µ
[1− e−µρD], (C1)
where N is the neutron production rate, σ is the (γ, n)
total cross section, NA = 6.022×1023 is Avogadro’s num-
ber, A is the atomic weight of the target material, φ0 is
the incident photon rate, µ is the mass attenuation cross
section, ρ is the density, and D is the thickness of the
material.
For a realistic cargo scanning system using the
11B(d,nγ)12C reaction with 1 mA of deuteron current,
φ0 ≈ 2×1010mA−1s−1(21), assuming a collimation width
of 3 mm at a distance 1 m from the target. Taking
D  1/µρ, i.e. a thick slab, σ = 40 mb(40), and
µ = 0.031 cm2/g(31), the neutron production rate would
be N = 4.2 × 105 s−1. For a comparison, the cosmo-
genic neutron rate is estimated by Gordon et al.41 is
approximately 0.0134 cm−2s−1, which includes contribu-
tions from thermal neutrons in addition to the fast neu-
trons of interest for this comparison. Integrating over
the volume of the plate described above, the cosmogenic
neutron exposure rate is Ncosm. ≈ 130 s−1. The neu-
tron production by (γ, n) reactions in the steel plate is
approximately 3300 times higher than the exposure to
cosmogenic neutrons, which corresponds to only ∼1 hour
of effective additional exposure to natural neutron back-
ground. As such, the exposure to the high energy gamma
rays in a single scan has a negligible effect on the addi-
tional buildup of transmuted elements and activation of
the material.
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